Public Safety/Private Sector Working to Solve the Problem

(reprinted from Police Chief, June 1997, LXIV(6) pp. 44-52.)

By Katherine Spivey and Renee Cobb, J.D., IACP

• Alarm Industry Growth
• What Doesn't Work
• The First Step
• What Does Work: Three Cities' Experience: Elgin, Bellevue, Philadelphia
• Expanding the Effort
• Alarm Industry Commitment
• Available Resources

Every day, police respond to an astounding—and ever-increasing—number of false alarm activations. These false alarm activations burden police departments and waste officer time, resources and dollars better employed for other efforts. Various surveys estimate that alarm calls account for 10 to 30 percent of all calls for police service; of these, 94 to 98 percent are false alarms.(1)

There are three major causes of false alarms: user error, technological error and improper installation. User errors— whether due to inadequate user training or the complexity of some alarm systems—are generally held to cause the greatest percentage of false alarms. Improper installations account for a smaller percentage of false alarms.

In a recent nationwide survey of 36,689 alarm systems, the Central Station Alarm Association (CSAA) found an average of 2.3 false activations per system per year. The residential rate was averaged at .96, the commercial rate at 2.75 (2). Based on these figures, the International Association of Chiefs of Police (IACP) and Professors Hakim and Blackstone from the Temple University Department of Economics have estimated that the direct annual cost of false alarms to police departments nationwide is at least $600 million, and that achieving a major reduction in false alarm activations could free up as many as 60,000 officers in the United States.(3)

The following examples illustrate the staggering costs of false alarms activations:

• In 1995, officers with the Riverside County, California, Sheriff's Department spent more than 8,000 hours responding to alarm calls in unincorporated areas. The cost to taxpayers was about $424,000.(4)

• Responding to false burglar alarm calls costs the Seattle, Washington, Police Department slightly over $1 million a year. Police are dispatched to about 30,000 alarms a year, about 96 percent of which are false.(5)

• Police in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, receive about 157,000 burglar-alarm calls a year, 98 percent of them false alarms. With the cost to taxpayers estimated at $28 for each false alarm, more than $4.2 million is wasted annually—enough to pay salaries and benefits for nearly 70 new officers or to purchase a fleet of 220 police cars.(6)

• False burglar alarms cost Chicago $10.5 million annually, tying up the equivalent of 209 police officers.(7)

• In Los Angeles, 95 percent of the 161,000 alarm calls made in one year were false, comprising 16 percent of all calls for police service and costing the city an estimated $2.8 million in lost police service.(8) Response time to burglar alarms currently averages 55 minutes in Los Angeles.

Although these statistics come from larger jurisdictions, in proportional terms smaller agencies face the same—if not more acute problems. Manpower deployment for a smaller agency is affected greatly by just a few events, which could literally mean there is no one available to answer the next call.

Alarm Industry Growth

The staggering costs to law enforcement are only expected to increase. One portent is the 1996 Telecommunications Act, which allows Bell operating companies to enter the alarm industry in 2001. Their entrance into the alarm market is expected to further reduce the price of home and business alarms, and will also make personal, individually carried alarms widely available.

The current electronic intrusion detection market has shown steady growth in both revenue and installations. As of December 31,1996, 23.8 million alarms were installed in the United States. Burglary installations continue to be the primary source of revenue for alarm dealers; however, access control, home automation and integrated systems are growing. Indeed, 54.9 percent of security installations completed in 1996 were residential alarms.(9)

Besides the growth in dealer-installed security installations, there is significant expansion in the "do-it-yourself" market. For example, one company that makes computer and entertainment equipment offers a free home security system when the purchaser agrees to a one-year monitoring contracts.(10) Even police departments are getting into the alarm business. Many departments are issuing silent emergency alarm systems to women in danger from abusive partners.(11)

Other factors are also expected to contribute to an increased number of false alarms, including

• insurance premium reductions and possible tax credits for security expenditures;
• emergence of global satellite positioning technology in vehicle and individual panic alarms; and
• the growth of car alarms installed as standard equipment in new vehicles.(12)

In other words, the more systems there are, the more alarm activations there are likely to be—and the more police resources will be wasted responding to false alarms.

What Doesn't Work

Current response patterns by many departments today reflect traditional reactive policing: police continue to respond to false alarms, often at the same address; however, repeated responses do not reduce the number of false alarm activations.

In response to the false alarm problem, some police agencies have used a variety of approaches. A few departments have modified or eliminated response to certain types of alarms, such as unverified commercial burglary alarms. Requiring registration and permits for system installation and charging high or escalating fines for false alarm activations are other approaches. Still others depend on an initial response by a private security service before dispatching office Some departments employ punitive actions; others rely on educational and preventive measure

Alarms are a proven method of detecting intrusions and communicating the need for help. The true solution to the false alarm problem requires a system-wide approach involving the public, the alarm industry and other enforcement agencies. The time has come to coordinate a nationwide, uniformed effort to develop measures that effectively reduce false alarms.

The First Step

In 1994, the IACP membership passed a resolution—"Measures to Reduce the Number of Police Responses to False Alarms"—urging police chiefs to attempt to reduce their alarm-response workload by considering various options and keeping the issue in the forefront of concerns to be addressed by the association's Private-Sector Liaison Committee (PSLC) and the Division of State Associations of Chiefs of Police (SACOP).

The PSLC has long been concerned about the problem of false alarms, both for law enforcement agencies and the communities they serve. To that end, it has invested considerable effort in addressing the problem. Its first step, in 1993, was to disseminate "False Alarm Perspectives: Solution-Oriented Resource," a report that highlighted the committee's concerns and shared some effective responses to the problem.(13)

What Does Work: Three Cities' Experiences

Elgin
Bellevue
Philadelphia

The next step, taken in conjunction with the alarm industry, was to initiate the Model Cities program in three cities: Philadelphia, Pennsylvania; Elgin, Illinois; and Bellevue, Washington. The program's intent was to curb false activations by working proactively with both alarm companies and alarm users.

False alarms in all three cities were substantially reduced. Philadelphia reduced false alarm dispatches by almost 8,000; Elgin cut the false alarm rate per system per year from 2.57 to 1.12 and reduced false alarm calls from 4,627 to 2,649; Bellevue reduced its false alarm rate from .91 to .77 per year per system. These successful pilot efforts identified a variety of strategies that can be implemented to dramatically reduce false alarms. Following are the key elements of each city's approach, as well as the results.

Elgin

Elgin implemented several measures:

• an alarm user permit requirement (at no charge);
• a program whereby an alarm company representative visits the consumer, completes a 15-point checklist and returns the checklist to the police;
• a $300 fine if response is made to a non-permitted system;
• a 30-minute timeout on outside audibles;
• a fine schedule as follows: one to four alarms, no charge; five to eight, $100 per false alarm; nine to 10, $200 per false alarm; more than 10, $300 plus revocation of permit;
• an appeals process that provides for the reinstatement of the alarm permit upon proof of effort to comply (although a subsequent false alarm will again revoke the permit);
• a policy of refusing to respond after 10 false alarms;
• an alarm trading process; and
• meetings with institutions with chronic false alarms (such as banks).

In response, the city saw a reduction of almost 30 percent in false alarms; the false alarm rate per system per year went from 2.57 to 1.12. Among the top 100 chronic offenders, the department's get-tough policy resulted in 50 percent fewer false alarms.

Bellevue

Bellevue took these steps:

• required no-fee registration;
• attempted Central Station alarm verification by the central station prior to dispatch;
• accepted alarm cancellations by the police after the dispatch;
• escalated false alarm fines as follows: no charge for first, $25 for second, $50 for third, $100 for fourth, fifth and sixth;
• implemented a one-year restricted response after the sixth false alarm (excluding response to panic and hold-up alarms); and
• conducted alarm user awareness classes targeting residential users.

Bellevue was able to reduce alarm dispatches from 6,861 to 5,960 in one year. More significantly, its dispatch rate after implementing the new policy was 34 percent lower than that prior to its implementation (408 dispatches per month after June 1 vs.621 per month before June 1). If the pre-June dispatch rate had continued throughout the year, Bellevue would have had 7,452 dispatches the highest total number in the department's history. By contrast, if the post June 1 rate had been experienced for the full year, the total number of dispatches would have been only 4,896.

Philadelphia

Philadelphia's program called for

• an annual $35 registration fee;
• the acceptance of alarm cancellations;
• three free false alarms per registration year;
• a $25 charge for four or more activations;
• a $100 fine for the use of an unregistered system;
• possible revocation of the user's registration following the activation of more than seven false alarms in a registration year;
• the imposition of judgments and liens (through municipal court) of up to $300 per violation when fines go unpaid; and
• administrative hearings in which violations can be disputed (similar to parking ticket dispute resolution process).

In addition, monthly meetings are held with alarm companies and city officials, including the deputy police commissioner, judges and the Bureau of Administrative Adjudication to ensure consistent enforcement.

The success of these measures resulted in an 11 percent reduction in burglar alarm calls from 1994-96, and a decrease in false alarm dispatches of almost 8,000 in one year. This, in turn, has produced a savings of 3,337 patrol hours and $332,598. Approximately 80 percent of alarm systems in Philadelphia are now registered.

Expanding the Effort

Building on the success of the Model Cities Program, SACOP has launched the Model States Program, with the objective of establishing a working relationship between law enforcement and the alarm industry that will address the causes of false dispatches, identify appropriate reduction programs, apply corrective actions and measure the progress of the false alarm dispatch programs. Components of the program include sample ordinances that will stand up to legal challenges, state licensing laws, community education and a response methodology that includes software aimed at identifying alarm owners, malfunction histories and chronic abusers. Five states—Florida, Illinois, Missouri, New York and Washington—have agreed to participate in this effort to reduce false alarms.

The representatives in these states are educating their local chiefs as to the purposes of the program, its importance to the law enforcement community and the need to provide points of contact in each city, coordinate efforts with the alarm industry, compile data on false alarms and help educate the public.

Departments interested in participating in this program must agree to

• implement a locally predetermined procedure to restrict or suspend police response to chronic abusers of alarm systems, and implement procedures that allow resumption of police response after corrective action has been taken;
• support required user training for chronic abusers and annual inspection of alarm systems by alarm companies;
• establish a protocol for police communication centers to accept requests for dispatch to burglary alarms only after verification from alarm companies;
• have law enforcement dispatch centers develop policy and implement procedures to accept verified cancellation of dispatch requests from alarm companies (this does not apply to hold-up and panic alarms that do not require verification and are not subject to cancellation);
• support efforts to establish or strengthen statewide licensing of alarm companies and employees;
• use the NBFAA Model Alarm Ordinance as a framework to develop steps to combat this problem in concert with local representatives of the alarm industry;
• implement automated data collection software;
• use a standardized data collection method;
• commit to sharing all collected false alarm data with the industry;
• help influence dealer participation by requesting their presence at joint meetings;
• encourage end-user participation or action as needed through letters, meetings, etc.;
• adopt appropriate standards for non-sworn responders if an alternative response is going to be used; and
• work with industry to establish a list server communication net for all participants in the Model States Program.

Elgin Police Chief Charles Gruber offers the following suggestions for increasing the chances of successful false alarm reduction, based on his own departments experiences:

• The key elements of success are serious-minded enforcement by the police and the chief's complete support.
• Progress is often inhibited by the natural tendency to resist change, as well as the tendency to resist admitting that there is a serious false alarm problem.
• The police must collect an accurate database in order to engage in meaningful communication with both the subscribers and the alarm companies.
• The alarm companies must commit significant resources to customer site visits, user education, and efforts to convince problem accounts of solutions to their false alarm problems.
• The community at large must be educated as to the need for and the requirements of the new ordinance.
• The greatest challenge was to overcome the complacency of both subscribers and alarm companies.

Alarm Industry Commitment

Like law enforcement, the alarm industry takes the false alarm problem very seriously. After all, false alarms work to no one's benefit, disappointing the customer who seeks safety, the alarm company business that seeks satisfied consumers and the police who seek to provide safety and install citizen responsibility. Realizing that a public/private partnership with the law enforcement community is the best way to resolve the problem, the alarm industry continues to contribute significant resources—both financial and other—to address the false alarm problem.

The industry has established a national office to coordinate the Model States Program, and many national alarm companies are contributing funds to the program, including ADT, Brinks and Masada. In addition, ADI, a major industry wholesaler, has established a program that will commit 0.5 to 1 percent of each total invoice for hardware (i.e., alarm products) purchased by members exclusively to support and expand the false alarm reduction efforts of the Alarm Industry and Research Educational Foundation (AIREF) program. AIREF will employ a false alarm coordinator in each of the five model states' programs who will be responsible to the AIREF board of directors and the national program coordinator. Working with the alarm companies and the law enforcement community, the state coordinator will collect, tabulate, report and coordinate data on false alarm reduction efforts within that state.

In addition, the board of directors of the Security Industry Association (SIA) has pledged $20,000 per month for the next two years to help with this project. This reflects an additional $480,000 in support and commitment by the alarm industry to find a solution to the false alarm problem.

Available Resources

There's good news for debriefs who want to increase their available manpower by 10 to 30 percent through false-alarm reduction: no longer are you left to your own devices in addressing this problem. Help is available through local state associations, the SACOP Division office at IACP headquarters, the PSLC and the alarm industry itself, including the industry's national coordinator of the Model States Program and the Alarm Industry Research and Educational Foundation.

Call any of these organizations for a video and a notebook full of material designed to help you develop a realistic program to reduce false alarms.

1. Renee Cobb and Simon Hakim, independent research, 1997.

2. Central Station Alarm Association, 1992-1993 False Alarm Committee Report, Bethesda, MD, 1994.

3. Cobb and Hakim.

4. Ila Adke, "Charging for Alarm Reports to be Topic," The Press Enterprise, March 13, 1996, B5.

5. Shelby Gilje, "False Alarms Cost Cops' Time and May Cost You Money," Seattle Times, Troubleshooter, E1, November 15, 1995.

6. Stephen Goode, "The Cost of Crying Wolf," The Washington Times, Waste & Abuse/Justice, October 30, 1995, p. 36.

7. Fran Spielman, "Firms Ticketed in Alarm Crackdown," Chicago Sun-Times, February 3, 1995, News: p. 24.

8. Tracey Kaplan, "Metropolitan Digest: Los Angeles County News in Brief: Council Takes Steps to Tighten Penalties for False-Alarm Calls," Los Angeles Times, September 1,1994, Metro (Part Is, P2, Col. 1, Metro Desk).

9. "Market Statistics: Revenue Sources," Security Sales, Redondo Beach, CA, 1996. (The 1996 Security Sales Dealer Survey was compiled by Advantage Business Research,, Inc., Lake Success, NY.)

10. "Free MagnavoxWireless Home Security System," Philips-Magnavox, 1 800/316 0075.

11. John W. Fountain, "New Alarm Passes Its First Test More Battered Women to Get the Devices," Washington Post, Fairfax Weekly, January 2,1997, p. VA 1.

12. William C. Cunningham, John J. Strachs and Clifford W. Van Meter, Private Security Trends, 1970-2000: The Hallcrest Report II (Stoneham, MA: Butterworth-Heinemann, 1990), p. 283.

13. Peter E. Ohlhausen, "False Alarm Perspectives: A Solution-Oriented Resource," International Association of Chiefs of Police, Alexandria, VA, September 1993.